Lessons from Alexandria: the Trinity, the Soteriological Problem, and the Rise of Modern Adventist AntiTrinitarianism by Jankiewicz, Darius
5Andrews University Seminary Studies, Vol. 50, No. 1, 5-24.
Copyright © 2012 Andrews University Press.
Lessons from ALexAndriA:  the trinity, the 
soterioLogicAL ProbLem, And the 
rise of modern Adventist 
AntitrinitAriAnism
Darius Jankiewicz
Andrews University
Among the ancient schools of  theology, Alexandria holds special prominence. 
The school began about 185 a.D. for the exclusive purpose of  instructing 
converts from paganism to Christianity. Very quickly, and under the leadership 
of  its principal theologians, Clement and Origen, it evolved into a major 
theological think-tank of  ancient Christianity. On one hand, the school played 
an important role in spurring the development of  many Christian doctrines, 
including the doctrines of  God, Christ, the Trinity, and salvation. On the other, 
however, theological aberrations incontrovertibly present in the thought of  
the Alexandrian thinkers left a troubling legacy. These errors have never been 
completely eradicated from Christian theology, have persisted throughout the 
centuries, and continue to periodically resurface in various theological circles, 
including Adventism. In recent years, a version of  an ancient error closely 
resembling Alexandrian subordinationism1 has resurfaced within some 
factions of  the Adventist community. 
It is my belief  that an understanding of  the theological thinking of  the 
Alexandrian school, however remote and seemingly irrelevant to believing 
Christians today, may aid in understanding the issues involved in modern-day 
trinitarian and soteriological debates, as well as protecting the community of  
believers from perpetuating the errors present in the Alexandrian thinking.2 
Let us begin with a brief  overview of  trinitarian developments up to the rise 
of  Alexandrian thinking.
 
Pre-Alexandrian Solutions
It goes without saying that the NT leaves its readers with a somewhat ambiguous 
picture regarding the doctrine of  the Trinity and the divinity of  Jesus Christ. 
1Subordinationism teaches that, whether in heaven or on earth, Christ is eternally 
subordinate to God the Father. In this school of  thought, the Holy Spirit is perceived 
as either the third person of  the Trinity, eternally subordinated to God the Father and 
Christ, or the nonpersonal power of  God. 
2For a deeper study that may aid in understanding the issues presented in this 
paper, see Joseph Trigg, Origen (London: Routledge, 1998). In their groundbreaking 
Early Arianism: A View of  Salvation, Robert C. Gregg and Dennis E. Groh show how 
Alexandrian Christology eventually resulted in full-blown Arian heresy (Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1981, e.g., 108-111); see also Jerry Moon, John Reeve, and Woodrow 
Whidden, The Trinity (Hagerstown: Review and Herald, 2002), esp. 135-139. 
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On one hand, it is evident that the NT has no argument with the monotheistic 
tradition of  the OT (see, e.g., Acts 17:22-31 and 1 Cor 8:4). On the other, it 
is also evident that the monotheistic status quo of  the OT is challenged. While 
from the outset Christian believers saw themselves as continuators of  the 
Jewish monotheistic tradition, they also presented themselves as believing in 
Jesus Christ, whom they described as having the characteristics that in the OT 
were decisively reserved for the deity (Luke 7:49; John 8:58; Phil 2:6; Col 2:9). 
Moreover, the Holy Spirit also received more attention and is presented in a 
different way from that found in the OT (John 14:16-18; Eph 4:20). It is not 
surprising, therefore, to find early postapostolic Christians grappling with the 
new vision of  the divine and its implications for the salvation of  humanity. 
While all recognized the special status of  Christ (and the Holy Spirit), they 
nevertheless struggled to explain how this harmonized with the monotheistic 
conception of  God and his function as the only redeemer of  humanity. As a 
result, a variety of  positions attempting to harmonize the OT monotheistic 
vision of  the divine with the NT data developed, some inclined toward the 
extreme. Thus, at one end of  the spectrum were those who tended to speak 
of  Christ as an elevated human being, the Messiah, but not God.3 The other 
extreme was populated by those who yearned to protect the unity of  God and 
tended to identify Christ and the Holy Spirit with God.4 The remainder of  
the early Christians found themselves somewhere between these two extreme 
positions. 
Several things can be said of  these early, pre-Nicaean5 efforts to explain 
the relationship between God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit. First, they all 
emphasized the unity of  God and, second, they tended to place Christ and 
the Holy Spirit in some form of  subordinate relationship to the supreme God 
of  the OT.6 Despite this, significant strides toward the recognition of  Christ’s 
3Ebionism may be cited as an early movement that is representative of  this view. 
Coming from a strong monotheistic position, this group could not reconcile the OT 
teachings on the deity with the Christian emphasis on the divinity of  Christ. For a 
detailed description of  the Ebionite heresy, see Millard J. Erickson, The Word Became 
Flesh (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991), 42-44. 
4While emphasizing the unity of  God, the Christian heresy known as Modalistic 
Monarchianism rejected the separate existence of  the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit. 
Instead, it saw Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit as different modes of  the Father’s 
existence. This heresy is also known as Patripassianism, or suffering of  the Father 
(Erickson, 48-50). Both of  these extremes (Ebionistic and Modalistic heresies), already 
considered deviant during the early Christian centuries, are still present within modern 
Christianity. 
5“Pre-Nicaean” refers to the time in the history of  Christianity prior to the First 
Council of  Nicaea in 325 a.D. 
6This is well illustrated by Tertullian, who states: “Thus the Father is distinct 
from the Son, being greater than the Son, in as much as He who begets is one, and 
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full divinity and coequality within the Trinity7 were made during the second 
century by thinkers such as Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, and Tertullian.8 The work 
of  Clement of  Alexandria and Origen, the chief  thinkers of  the Alexandrian 
school of  theology, fits within this tradition of  trinitarian thinking.
 
Clement of  Alexandria (ca. 155-215 a.d.)
Little is known of  Titus Flavius Clemens, otherwise known as Clement of  
Alexandria. It appears that he was born in Athens, where he received his early 
education. He was a pagan convert to Christianity, who became the head of  
the Alexandrian school of  theology upon the death of  its founder, Pantaenus, 
and was the teacher of  Origen.9 Three extant works are attributed to him: the 
Protreptikos (Exhortation to the Heathen), in which he urges pagans to convert 
to Christianity; the Paidagogos, the purpose of  which was to teach Christians 
He who is begotten is another; He, too, who sends is one, and He who is sent is 
another; and He, again, who makes is one, and He through whom the thing is made 
is another” (Prax. 9; ANF 3:604). Other early Christian fathers exhibited a similar 
tendency. Thus W. Marcus states: “It [subordinationism] is a characteristic tendency in 
much Christian teaching of  the first three centuries, and is a marked feature of  such 
otherwise orthodox Fathers such as St Justin and St Irenaeus” (“Subordinationism,” 
The Oxford Dictionary of  the Christian Church [1997]: 1552). 
7The very term “Trinity” also traces its origin to this era. Theophilus of  Antioch 
(ca. 180 a.D.) was the first Christian thinker to use the Greek term tria,j (Autol. 2.15; 
ANF 2:101), while Tertullian was the first to introduce the Latin version of  the term 
into Christian theology. Tarmo Toom, Classical Trinitarian Theology (New York: T. & T. 
Clark, 2007), 62; Williston Walker, A History of  the Christian Church (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 66. 
8Thus Justin Martyr wrote: “both Him and the Son (who came forth from Him 
and taught us these things . . . ), and the prophetic Spirit, we worship and adore, knowing 
them in reason and truth” (1 Apol. 6; ANF 1:164); similarly, Irenaeus put forth his three 
famous articles of  faith: “God, the Father, uncreated, beyond grasp, invisible, one God 
the maker of  all; this is the first and foremost article of  our faith. But the second article 
is the Word of  God, the Son of  God, Christ Jesus our Lord. . . . And the third article 
is the Holy Spirit, through whom the prophets prophesied and the patriarchs were 
taught about God” (Epid. 6, trans. and ed. Joseph P. Smith [New York: Newman, 1952], 
51); and, finally, Tertullian, with reference to Gen 1:26, wrote that “it was because He 
had already His Son close at His side, as a second Person, His own Word, and a third 
Person also, the Spirit in the Word, that He purposely adopted the plural phrase, ‘Let us 
make;’ and, ‘in our image;’ and, ‘become as one of  us’” (Prax. 12; ANF 3:606, emphasis 
original). 
It must be noted, however, that while pointing the way toward the later 
development of  belief  in the coequality of  God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit within the 
Trinity, none of  these early pre-Nicaean thinkers fully embraced these concepts. 
9Kenneth S. Latourette, A History of  Christianity (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1975), 146-147; cf. Henry Chadwick, The Church in Ancient Society: From Galilee to Gregory 
the Great (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 124-125. 
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the fundamentals of  Christian conduct; and the Stromateis (Miscellanies), a 
collection of  loosely organized notes dealing with various theological issues.10 
Clement left behind no systematic theology, a task later attempted by his most 
illustrious student, Origen.11 He held strong beliefs that Greek philosophy, 
especially Middle Platonism,12 was closely related to Christian theology, and he 
saw Christianity as the final development of  Greek philosophical ideals. God, 
he argued, gave philosophy to the Greeks in much the same way he provided 
the Hebrews with the Law of  Moses.13 Believing that “all truth is God’s truth 
wherever it may be found,” a saying often attributed to him, Clement felt no 
restraints in using pagan Greek philosophy to explain the intricacies of  the 
Christian faith, while at the same time making it more reasonable to the pagan 
mind.14  
Clement’s teachings on God and the Trinity began with his affirmation 
of  the absolute transcendence of  God, an idea clearly echoing the main 
characteristic of  the Supreme Mind, or “the One,” of  Middle Platonism.15 
10Walker, 73; Latourette, 147. 
11Justo Gonzalez, A History of  Christian Thought: From the Beginnings to the Council of  
Chalcedon (Nashville: Abingdon, 1987), 204; Walker, 74.
12Middle Platonism, sometimes referred to as pre-Neoplatonism, was an 
improvement on Platonic “good” and postulated the existence of  the divine mind 
that could, at a stretch, be reminiscent of  the Christian God. The Platonic “ideas,” 
or “forms,” thus existed in the mind of  God. Middle Platonism was the form of  
Greek philosophy used and adapted by the Alexandrian theologians. For an extensive 
description of  Middle Platonism, see John Dillon, The Middle Platonists (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1977); cf. Everett Ferguson, Backgrounds of  Early Christianity (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 364-366. 
13Clement, Strom. 7.2 (ANF 2:524-525); cf. Gonzalez, 193; and Alister E. 
McGrath, Historical Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 89. 
14Roger E. Olson and Adam C. English, Pocket History of  Theology (Downers 
Grove: InterVarsity, 2005), 20; Calvin Stapert, A New Song for an Old World: Musical 
Thought in the Early Church (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 46-47. 
15Henry Fiska Hägg, Clement of  Alexandria and the Beginnings of  Christian Apophaticism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 155-159. Thus Clement wrote: “And if  we 
give him a name, either we call him the One or the Good or Mind or Being or Father 
or God or the Demiurge or Lord, we do not do it in a correct way, and we do not talk 
as if  conferring a name on him. But because of  our helplessness, we use nice names so 
that our mind may have these things to lean upon and not wander at random. For one 
by one they do not contain information about God, but all together they are indicative 
of  the power of  the Almighty” (Clement, Strom. 5.82.1-2; Hägg, 156, translation his); 
cf. Robert McQueen Grant, Gods and the One God (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 
91. Roger Olson provides an apt description of  the philosophical conception of  God 
that goes back to Plato: “Clement’s God was like the God of  Greek philosophy—a 
bare unity without parts or passions that cannot even be described except negatively 
and who can only relate to the world of  nature and history through an intermediate 
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As such, God was ineffable, timeless, and completely beyond the power of  
human comprehension. As a result, there was need for a mediator, the Logos.16 
This Logos was the source of  all knowledge available to humanity, and, most 
especially, of  the knowledge of  God. It was the Logos who “gave philosophy 
to Greeks,” prepared the way for Christianity, and which became paidagogos (or 
teacher or instructor), for Christian believers.17  
Clement spoke highly of  the Logos, whom he identified with the biblical 
Son of  God. He wrote of  the Son: “Now, O you, my children, our Instructor 
is like His Father God, whose Son He is, sinless, blameless, and with a soul 
devoid of  passion; God in the form of  man, stainless, the minister of  His 
Father’s will, the Word who is God, who is in the Father, who is at the Father’s 
right hand, and with the form of  God is God.”18 He further identified the Son 
as the wisdom of  God, the “energy of  the Father,” the “cause of  all good 
things,” “the first efficient cause of  motion,” and “the first Administrator 
of  the universe, who by the will of  the Father directs the salvation of  all.”19 
Despite using such exalted language in speaking of  the Son, endowing him 
with pre-existence, and even bestowing upon him the title “God,” Clement 
hesitated to ascribe to him the supreme, underived divinity that would make 
the Logos equal with God. Thus, nowhere in his writings can one find such 
an identification made in clear, unequivocal terms.20 Instead, we find in 
Clement statements such as “For the Son is the power of  God, as being 
the Father’s most ancient Word before the production of  all things”; “the 
Son is . . . an energy of  the Father”; “But the nature of  the Son, which is 
nearest to Him who is alone the Almighty One, is the most perfect, and most 
holy.”21 A careful exegesis of  Clement’s writings by a scholar of  antiquity, 
Alvan Lamson, prompted him to conclude that “none of  the Platonizing 
Fathers before Origen have acknowledged the inferiority of  the Son in more 
explicit terms than Clement.”22 Louis Berkhof  concurred when he argued 
being called Logos” (The Story of  Christian Theology [Downers Grove: InterVarsity 
Academic, 1999], 90). 
16Clement, Paed. 3.1 (ANF 2:271). Hägg, 181; and John Ferguson, Clement of  
Alexandria (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1974), 62, 90.
17Clement, Strom. 7.2; 6.5 (ANF 2:524, 489); cf. Gonzalez, 191-193. 
18Clement, Paed. 1.2 (ANF 2:209-210).
19Clement, Strom. 7.2 (ANF 2:524-525). 
20Alvan Lamson, The Church of  the First Three Centuries (Boston: Walker, Wise, and 
Co.),  88-89;  cf. Piotr Ashwin-Siejkowski, Clement of  Alexandria on Trial (Leiden: Brill, 
2010), 62-63; and Charles Bigg, The Christian Platonists of  Alexandria (Oxford: Claredon, 
1886), 67-68. 
21Clement, Strom. 7.2 (ANF 2:524-525). 
22Lamson, 88; cf. Eric Osborn, The Emergence of  Christian Theology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 184.
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that, although Clement came close to recognizing Christ’s full divinity, he 
nevertheless could not escape the clutches of  subordinationism. While he 
spoke of  the Logos’s eternity, Clement defined “the phrase in such a way as 
to teach not merely an economic but an essential subordination of  the Son 
to the Father.”23 Indeed, the Middle Platonic monistic understanding of  the 
deity as simple and undivided would preclude any complexity in the nature of  
God, while, at the same time, welcome the existence of  inferior intermediaries 
such as the Logos.24
How did the Logos become Christ, according to Clement? Prior to its 
generation, the Logos existed in the form of  “wisdom” in the mind of  God 
and as a potential being. In this way, Clement could boldly ascribe eternity to 
Christ.25 In eternity past, the Logos issued forth (“emanated,” or “generated”) 
from the Father.26 Clement described this process in terms closely resembling 
the bringing forth of  the World Soul from the Supreme Mind of  Middle 
Platonic philosophy.27 Following this stage of  his existence, when the Logos 
“was with God,” the Word became incarnated in the human form of  Jesus 
Christ, the Son of  God.28 The life of  Christ, as the incarnated Logos, was a 
23Louis Berkhof, The History of  Christian Doctrines (London: Banner of  Truth Trust, 
1937), 72;  cf. Chadwick, 128. Economic subordination versus essential subordination 
corresponds to the economic versus essential understanding of  the Trinity. The former 
refers to the way in which the Godhead was revealed and related to humanity, i.e., the 
position that the Son has the same divine attributes as the Father, but voluntarily 
submitted himself  to the Father while on earth. Essential Trinity is a view of  the 
Godhead as it existed prior to incarnation and after the resurrection of  Christ. The 
essential subordination position thus puts forth a view that Christ was subordinated to 
God not only while here on earth, but also throughout eternity. 
24Middle Platonism and its influence upon Clement’s thought is well documented 
by Hägg; see esp. 71-133, 143, 159, 181-185.
25Lamson, 78;  cf. Harry Wolfson, “Clement of  Alexandria on the Generation of  
the Logos,” Church History 20 (June 1951): 75.
26By the time of  Clement, the concept of  “generation” already had a long 
philosophical history. Having its roots in Platonic and Aristotelian thought, the theory 
continued to be developed within various philosophical circles of  antiquity. Gitte Buch-
Hansen, “It Is the Spirit that Gives Life”: A Stoic Understanding of  Pneuma in John’s Gospel 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 178-179. For the Gnostic Valentinian theologians of  the 
second century a.D., generation, or emanation, denoted the procession of  the Gnostic 
Savior. It was thus natural for Clement to avail himself  of  the long philosophical 
tradition to explain the genesis of  the Christian Savior (Alastair H. B. Logan, Gnostic Truth 
and Christian Heresy [London: T. & T. Clark, 2004], 33). For Clement, the “generation” 
of  the Logos was absolutely necessary, as without it the ineffable and timeless God 
would not be able to communicate with creation (Hägg, 158-159, 181; Olson, 90). 
27Salvatore R. C. Lilla, Clement of  Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and 
Gnosticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 202-204. 
28Hägg, 187-188; Clement, Strom. 5.3 (ANF 2, 448). 
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continuation of  the perfect union with God that he had had in his preexistent 
state.29 Christ is thus perfectly positioned to become “our Instructor” and 
source of  all true gnosis (in contrast to the false gnosis of  the Gnostics).30  
This knowledge was essential for Christians to enter upon a path of  
salvation31 that would ultimately end in being “godlike,” which Clement defines 
as being “impassible” or free from passion in all aspects of  life.32 Through 
this knowledge, Christ teaches believers to distinguish good from evil and 
“cures the unnatural passions of  the soul by means of  exhortations.”33  
But Christ is more than just a conduit of  divine knowledge. He also serves 
as an example of  virtuous living to believers.34 A believer is to reproduce 
Christ’s obedience to the commandments, even if  it leads to martyrdom. 
Indeed, he who follows a path to martyrdom suffers out of  love for God 
and “for his own salvation.”35 Thus, following the example of  Christ by being 
obedient to the commandments was a sure way to eternal life. In Clement’s 
own words, “Let us then aim at the fulfillment of  the commandments by the 
works of  the Lord; for the Word Himself  also, having openly become flesh, 
exhibited the same virtue, both practical and contemplative. Wherefore let 
us regard the Word as law, and His commands and counsels as the short and 
straight paths to immortality.”36
Unfortunately, such hellenizing exerted a heavy price on Clement’s 
soteriology and took him on a path foreign to that of  the NT. His emphasis 
on attainment of  the true gnosis, on obedience, and on following the example 
of  Christ led him to place more value on human achievement than on Christ’s 
accomplishments on the cross. Indeed, the value of  Christ’s sacrifice on 
Calvary seems to be little more than an example of  a “perfect work of  love.”37 
Instead, Clement appeared to be more interested in the “philosophical” 
accomplishments and qualities of  the incarnated Logos, such as sinless 
29Chadwick, 128. 
30Clement, Paed. 1.7 (ANF 2:222-223); Clement, Strom. 6.9 (ANF 2:497); cf. 1.20 
(ANF 2:323). 
31In fact, Clement sees this knowledge as inseparable from salvation. “The 
knowledge of  God [and] everlasting salvation . . . are entirely identical” (Strom. 4.22; 
ANF 2:434); idem, Paed. 1.2-3 (ANF 2:210-211); cf., Hägg, 143-144.
32Clement, Strom. 6.9 (ANF 2:496-497); cf. Eric Osborn, Clement of  Alexandria 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 234.
33Clement, Paed. 1.2 (ANF 2:210). 
34“But having assumed sensitive flesh, He came to show man what was possible 
through obedience to the commandments” (Clement, Strom. 7.2; ANF 2:525). 
35Ibid., 4.4, 7 (ANF 2:411, 417).
36Clement, Paed. 1.3 (ANF 2:211). 
37Clement, Strom. 4.4 (ANF 2:411-412). 
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perfection and passionlessness.38 In this, and in contrast to the writers of  the 
NT, Clement followed the well-established trajectory of  thought present in 
the various strands of  Greek philosophy, where through special knowledge 
and self-sacrifice a person could become Godlike, sinless, devoid of  passion, 
anger, and carnal desires.39 “Abstinence from what is evil,” Clement argued, 
“is a step to the highest perfection.”40 This, he believed, was the highest 
accomplishment of  the apostles, who mastered such an attitude “through 
a steady condition of  mind, not changing a whit [and] . . . ever continuing 
unvarying in a state of  training after the resurrection of  the Lord.”41
It becomes clear, therefore, that Clement promoted “deification” or 
becoming “godlike”42 as the mode of  salvation.43 Such an understanding of  
salvation requires a rather optimistic anthropology, in which human beings 
innately possess the ability to embark on the journey toward perfection.44 
In his classic of  Clement’s writings, G. W. Butterworth identifies five stages 
of  deification. First, there is baptism, followed by enlightenment, sonship, 
perfection, and immortality. “Perfection and immortality,” Butterworth notes, 
“are of  course two prominent characteristics of  God, and when man attains 
them he becomes like God.”45 What was the source of  Clement’s ideas on 
deification, i.e., becoming God-like while on this earth? Butterworth answers: 
“Certainly it was not in the Scriptures. There is nothing in either the Old 
Testament or the New Testament which by itself  could even faintly suggest 
that man might practice being a god in this world.” He lays the blame squarely 
at the feet of  Greek philosophy, and especially Plato, who viewed the life of  
38Thus Clement writes: “But He [Christ] was entirely impassible . . . inaccessible 
to any movement of  feeling—either pleasure or pain” (ibid., 6.9; ANF 2:496). 
39Ibid., 4.22 (ANF 2:435); 6.9 (ANF 2:496-497). 
40Ibid., 4.22 (ANF 2:434).
41Ibid., 6.9 (ANF 2:496); cf. idem, 4.21 and 22 (ANF 2:434-435). 
42Clement, Strom. 6.9 (ANF 2:497). Clement was one of  the earliest Christian 
theologians to use the term theopoieo, “being made like God.” This term is closely 
associated with the concept of  theosis (usually translated as “divinization,” “deification,” 
“being made divine”), which became the hallmark of  pre-Nicaean Eastern Christian 
theology. G. W. Butterworth notes that while there are slight differences among the 
early Christian theologians who wrote in Greek, all are essentially in agreement with 
Clement’s views on deification (“The Deification of  Man in Clement of  Alexandria,” 
JTS (Old series) 17 (1916): 162; cf. Osborn, Clement of  Alexandria, 234. 
43“To the likeness of  God, then, he that is introduced into adoption and the 
friendship of  God . . . if  he be perfected, according to the Gospel, as the Lord Himself  
taught” (Clement, Strom. 6.14; ANF 2:506); cf. 6.9 (ANF 2:497).
44Osborn, Clement of  Alexandria, 234; cf. Clement, Strom. 4:23 (ANF 2:436-437). 
It must be noted that most of  the pre-Nicaean Greek-speaking theologians shared 
Clement’s optimistic view of  human nature. 
45Butterworth, 160. 
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an enlightened human being as a gradual ascent toward sinless perfection, and 
thus divinity.46  
In view of  the heavy influence of  Middle Platonism upon Clement’s 
understanding of  God and the Logos, the mediator and the transmitter of  
the true gnosis, it is not surprising that his Christ was not, and indeed could 
not be, coequal with the Almighty God. The Middle Platonic influence upon 
his thought would clearly preclude such a possibility. Instead, like a Greek 
philosopher of  a higher order, Christ is the medium as well as the “teacher” 
who imparts true divine gnosis and who provides an example of  an enlightened 
life. If  this is the mode of  salvation, then there is no logical requirement for 
Christ to be coequal in all attributes to God the Father. 
How does the Holy Spirit fit into Clement’s theology? There appears 
to be scholarly agreement that Clement’s writings on the Holy Spirit tend to 
be vague and contradictory, with no clear explanation as to the Spirit’s exact 
nature or relationship to the Father and the Son.47 In fact, as R. B. Tollington 
noted, there appears to be little room in Clement’s theological system for the 
Holy Spirit, as all the functions assigned by the NT to the Spirit are fulfilled 
by the Logos. Thus he states,
If  Christian theology had developed on Clement’s lines, it would have 
resulted in a different conception of  the Trinity from that which the 
Church eventually adopted. It would have given us a transcendent Father, 
an all-pervading Logos or Spirit, a supreme historic manifestation at the 
Incarnation. And the last named would have been so purely a mode or 
limitation of  the universal Logos, that a Duality rather than a Trinity would 
have been the result.48
Despite leaving questions regarding the exact nature of  the Logos and 
the Holy Spirit as well as their relationship to God unanswered, Clement did, 
at times, speak of  the triune nature of  God, while the trinitarian formulas 
are found throughout his works.49 Unquestionably clothed in Christian 
46Ibid., 163.
47Latourette, 148. William G. Rusch writes that Clement viewed the Spirit as the 
power that emanates from the Word and is diffused through creation in order to attract 
human beings to God (The Trinitarian Controversy [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980], 12).
48R. B. Tollington, Clement of  Alexandria: A Study in Christian Liberalism (London: 
Williams and Norgate, 1914), 1:359-360. Bogdan Gabriel Bucur came to a similar 
conclusion. He thus writes: “Clement illustrates a widespread phenomenon in early 
Christian thought, namely the lack of  careful distinction between ‘Logos’ and ‘Spirit.’ 
Whenever he offers his own theological reflection (as opposed to simply passing 
on traditional formulas of  faith), Clement feels free to use ‘Logos’ and ‘Pneuma’ 
as synonyms by shifting between them repeatedly and without much explanation” 
(Angelomorphic Pneumatology: Clement of  Alexandria and Other Early Christian Witnesses 
[Leiden: Brill, 2009], 75).
49See, e.g., Clement, Paed. 3.12 (ANF 2:295), in which Clement provides this 
14 seminary stuDies 50 (spring 2012)
terminology; however, his descriptions of  the Deity are heavily influenced by 
the models of  the divine and of  salvation (i.e., acquirement of  the true gnosis) 
found in the prevailing philosophy of  the age in which he lived.50 While his 
subordinationistic views were more tacit than pronounced, Clement’s most 
eminent student, Origen, took his teacher’s theology and developed it in a 
more systematic way.
Origen of  Alexandria (ca. 185-254 a.d.)
Recognized for his brilliance, Origen was chosen by Clement to take over the 
leadership of  the catechetical school in Alexandria, a position the latter held 
until at least 231 a.D. Unlike Clement, Origen was born into a Christian family 
and from an early age was exposed to the teachings of  the Bible and the early 
church fathers. As a student, and later as the head of  the catechetical school, 
he distinguished himself  by careful scholarship and a successful writing career. 
With regard to the scope of  his work, Origen is often compared to Augustine, 
and it is estimated that he produced over six thousand scrolls containing 
various theological discourses.51 Known as the systematic theologian of  
the Alexandrian school, he surpassed Clement in constructing a theological 
system in which he sought to harmonize the emerging Neoplatonism with 
Christianity.52 Unlike many other church fathers, and notwithstanding his 
extraordinary contributions to theology, Origen was never canonized as a 
saint, as posterity was unable to decide if  he was an orthodox or a heretic.53 
On one hand, his work led many pagan thinkers to take Christianity seriously. 
On the other, his syncretistic approach to theology created confusion and 
much heartache to future generations of  theologians.54 His theological legacy 
remarkable trinitarian formula: “and giving thanks may praise, and praising thank the 
[sic ] Alone Father and Son, Son and Father, the Son, Instructor and Teacher, with the 
Holy Spirit, all in One, in whom is all, for whom all is One” (Clement, Strom. 4.26; 
ANF 2:439).
50Rusch, 12.
51Gonzalez, 205; Chadwick, 135; Olson, The Story of  Christian Faith, 99. 
52Neoplatonism was a philosophical system that originated with Plotinus (ca. 
205-270 a.D.). It emerged in the footsteps of  Middle Platonism at the time of  Origen 
(The Oxford Dictionary of  the Christian Church [1997], sv “Neoplatonism”). 
53While many theologians of  the early church were deeply influenced by Origen, 
and his views were considered influential for formulation of  trinitarian doctrines in 
the fourth century, some of  his views were condemned during the Second Council 
of  Constantinople in 553 a.D. For a carefully nuanced discussion on Origen, see the 
excellent volume by Elizabeth Clark, The Origenist Controversy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992). 
54Olson, The Story of  Christian Theology, 102. One such heartache was caused by 
Origen’s universalistic views of  salvation. For a recent analysis of  Origen’s universalism, 
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is thus ambiguous. His greatest works on theology are Contra Celsum (Against 
Celsus) and De Principiis (On First Principles). Despite his fame, he lived a simple, 
ascetic life.55 
The entire trinitarian theology of  Origen is governed by three a priori 
principles that he considered as self-evident teachings of  the NT: first, there 
is one God who is the Father of  Jesus Christ; second, Jesus Christ was born 
of  the Father before all creatures; and, third, “the Holy Spirit was associated 
in honour and dignity with the Father and the Son.”56 Origen’s theology of  the 
Trinity also began with the person of  God and his nature and, like Clement, 
he tended to describe God in monistic terms. God the Father, he insisted, was 
“altogether Mona,j [Monad ], and so to speak,  `Ena,j [Henad ].”57 In philosophical 
language, both of  these terms referred to an indivisible, hence ultimately 
simple and unknowable entity, the latter even more strongly conveying these 
qualities.58 God was thus incomprehensible; transcendent; perfect in every 
way; without body, parts, or passion; the Absolute One, nothing of  whom 
could possibly be known.59 No other form of  existence could ever assume 
its place. For this, Origen found support in Jesus’ statement that the Father 
is “the only true God” (John 17:3). Thus, Jesus’ Father alone was ingenerate, 
having no explanation for his existence.60 Those who attempted to explain 
God in terms of  complexity endangered his absolute unity and eternal 
existence. Origen explained: “But God, who is the beginning of  all things, is 
not to be regarded as a composite [or complex] being, lest perchance there 
should be found to exist elements prior to the beginning itself, out of  which 
everything is composed, whatever that be which is called composite.”61 This 
being alone, the uncreated Creator, Sustainer of  the universe, was the ultimate 
source of  all existence.62 In spite of  Origen’s frequent use of  NT language, his 
“God” thus had more in common with the Platonic conception of  the deity 
than with the God of  the Bible. 
see Mark S. M. Scott, “Guarding the Mysteries of  Salvation: The Pastoral Pedagogy of  
Origen’s Universalism,” JECS 18 (Fall 2010): 347-368. 
55Trigg, 14.
56Origen, Princ. “Introduction” 4  (ANF 4:240); cf. Bernhard Lohse, A Short 
History of  Christian Doctrine (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), 46. 
57Origen, Princ. 1.1.6 (ANF 4:243).
58J. Hirschberger, “Monad,” The New Catholic Encyclopedia (1967), 9:1018. 
59Origen, Princ. 1.1.1 (ANF 4:242-243).
60Ibid., 1.2.4 (ANF 4:247-248); cf. Donald K. McKim, Theological Turning Points: 
Major Issues in  Christian Thought (Atlanta: John Knox, 1988), 12; and Peter McEnhill and 
G. M. Newlands, Fifty Key Christian Thinkers (Florence, KY: Routledge, 2002), 172. 
61Origen, Princ. 1.1.6 (ANF 4:244).
62Ibid., (ANF 4:243-244).
16 seminary stuDies 50 (spring 2012)
Since Origen conceived his God in terms of  perfect goodness and 
power, he claimed that there must have always existed the object toward 
which he could exercise his goodness and power. Origen thus posited the 
existence of  a timeless and eternal universe inhabited by spiritual beings 
(or souls), which existed in coeternal relationship with him but which were 
always subordinate.63 The unity of  God and the multiplicity of  the universe, 
however, were incompatible. To bring together the absolute divine unity with 
the multiplicity of  spiritual beings, Origen argued for the eternal existence of  
a mediator, the eternal Logos. But where did the Logos come from? To explain 
the existence of  the Logos, Origen turned to Neoplatonism, which posited 
the existence of  subordinate beings in terms of  generation, procession, or 
emanation rather than in the language of  creation. Neoplatonic teachers 
taught that out of  the “Absolute One” there proceeds (emanates) the Mind 
(nous). This Mind, they insisted, was not created and thus has no beginning.64 
While Clement appeared to be somewhat ambivalent with regard to the 
concept of  Middle Platonic generation, the genius of  Origen lies in the fact 
that he embraced the idea of  generation wholeheartedly and thus explained 
the relationship between the Father and the Son (the Logos).65 Notwithstanding 
the danger of  oversimplification, the concept of  “eternal generation” can 
be made intelligible by comparing it to the process of  yeast reproduction. 
Yeasts are unicellular organisms, which reproduce asexually through a process 
known as budding. When yeasts reproduce, the end result is a clone equal to 
and separate from the original; however, in the case of  eternal generation, as 
understood by Origen, the primary cell would always remain primary and the 
secondary cell always secondary. The process of  “generation,” moreover, is 
suspended in eternity in such a way that the secondary cell never separates 
from its originator. Another useful metaphor that may help to explain the 
concept of  generation, and perhaps one closer to Origen’s own thought, might 
be that of  the will’s emergence from the mind.66 Explaining the relationship 
between the Father and the Son in terms of  eternal generation allowed 
Origen to speak unabashedly of  Christ as sharing coeternal existence with 
the Father and thus participating in his nature.67 Thus, we can see in Origen a 
63Thus Origen wrote: “As no one can be a father without having a son, nor a 
master without possessing a servant, so even God cannot be called omnipotent unless 
there exist those over whom He may exercise His power” (Princ. 1.2.10; ANF 4:249-
250). 
64Ferguson, 368. 
65Origen, Princ. 1.2.6 (ANF 4:248).
66Ibid., (ANF 4:247-248); cf. Rusch, 13.
67James Orr, The Progress of  Dogma (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1960), 84. It is often 
stated in scholarly circles that to support his thesis, Origen introduced a well-known 
philosophical expression homoousios (of  the same substance) into Christian theology, 
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strong tendency to underline the full divinity of  Christ; however, despite such 
forceful emphasis on Christ’s “full” divinity, all of  Origen’s trinitarian theology 
was nevertheless marked by an unrelenting bent toward subordinationism.68 
This is understandable, considering the fact that he was a strong opponent 
of  a heresy known as Modalistic Monarchianism, which, in the name of  the 
unity of  God, identified Christ with the Father.69 To counter this, Origen was 
forced to find terminology that would point to the distinctions among the 
three beings within the Godhead. To accomplish this, he introduced another 
complicated Neoplatonic term, hypostasis, which carried strong connotations 
of  distinct personalities.70 While the Father was considered by Origen to be 
the absolute God, and thus a special or unique category of  hypostasis, the 
Logos could not possibly fulfill such a function and, in the end, had to be 
subordinated to the Father. It is not surprising, therefore, to find Origen 
referring to Christ as the theos deuteros (second God).71 
Origen’s subordinationism was most clearly asserted in his Commentary on 
John, in which he argued against those who tended to exalt the Son excessively. 
“This is why we say the Savior and the Holy Spirit transcend all created beings, 
not by comparison, but by their exceeding pre-eminence. The Father exceeds 
the Savior as much (or even more) as the Savior himself  . . . exceed[s] the 
rest.”72 In another place in the same volume, he stated that the Son “would not 
remain God if  he did not continue in unceasing contemplation of  the depth 
of  the Father.”73 Thus, it can be stated, in agreement with William Rusch, that 
in Origen we find the Son whose “deity is derived from the fountainhead, the 
Father. . . . In spite of  the fact that the Word is one with the Father, he stands 
on a lower level in the hierarchy.”74 
the first Christian theologian who appeared to do so. See, e.g., Lewis Ayres, Nicaea 
and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 24; McKim, 12; and John Behr, The Way to Nicea (Crestwood: 
St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001), 188. In recent years, however, M. J. Edwards 
challenged this theory in his article, “Did Origen Apply the Word Homousios to the 
Son?” (JTS 49 [Autumn 1998]: 658-670).
68See, e.g., Origen, Cels. 5.39 (ANF 4:561), in which Origen speaks of  Christ as 
a “second” God.
69Gonzalez, 219. 
70Origen, Princ. 1.3.4 (ANF 4:248); cf. Trigg, 23; M. J. Edwards, Catholicity and 
Heresy in the Early Church (London: Ashgate, 2009), 65; and Ayres, 25.
71Origen, Cels. 5.39 (ANF 4:561).
72Origen, Comm. Jo. 13.151, in Origen: Commentary on the Gospel According to John, 
Books 13–32, ed. Ronald E. Heine (Washington, DC: Catholic University of  America 
Press, 1993), 100.
73Ibid., 99. 
74Rusch, 14.
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But what of  the Holy Spirit? Here Origen went beyond Neoplatonism 
and Clement. While discussing the nature of  the Father, the Son, and their 
intricate relationship, he utilized the subtleties of  Greek philosophical 
language; however, in his discourse on the Holy Spirit, he tended to rely 
primarily on the testimony of  the Scriptures.75 As with the Father and the 
Son, he described the Holy Spirit in hypostatic language, i.e., as a being that 
had a separate, divine personality. The scriptural evidence was so obvious to 
him that he wondered how anyone could ever question the existence of  the 
third person of  the Trinity. The “authority and dignity” of  the Holy Spirit 
was of  such magnitude “that saving baptism was not complete except by 
the authority of  the most excellent Trinity of  them all, i.e., by the naming of  
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.”76 The Spirit, he further argued in his Commentarii 
in Romanos, “is always with the Father and the Son; and he always is, was, and 
shall be, just like the Father and the Son.”77 Origen thus strongly affirmed the 
coeternity of  the Spirit. 
How then is the Holy Spirit related to the Father and the Son? Consistent 
with his subordinationist tendencies, Origen ranked the Holy Spirit below the 
Father and the Son. The Spirit was the highest of  all beings that proceeded, 
or was eternally generated, from the Father and from the Son. Accordingly, 
he wrote, “The Holy Spirit seems to have need of  the Son ministering to his 
hypostasis, not only for it to exist, but also for it to be wise, and rational, and 
just, and whatever other thing we ought to understand it to be by participation 
in the aspects of  Christ.”78 The role of  the Spirit appears to be limited, 
however, to supplying believers with God’s gifts, thus enabling the church to 
function as the body of  Christ.79 
In Origen, then, we find two seemingly conflicting trends of  trinitarian 
thinking. On one hand, he came closer than any other contemporary church 
father to the orthodox trinitarian expression of  the Christian faith. None 
of  the early Christian thinkers exalted Christ and the Holy Spirit more than 
he did. On the other, his philosophical presuppositions apparently rendered 
him unable, or perhaps unwilling, to shake off  the strong undercurrent of  
subordinationism that typified his theological thinking. 
75Origen, Princ. 1.3 (ANF 4:251-254).
76Ibid., 1.3.2 (ANF 4:252).
77Origen, Comm. Rom. 6.7.19, in Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 
Books 6–10, ed. Thomas P. Scheck (Washington, DC: Catholic University of  America 
Press, 2002), 29; cf. Tarmo Toom, Classical Trinitarian Theology (New York: T. & T. 
Clark, 2007), 68. 
78Origen, Comm. Jo. 2.76, in Origen: Commentary on the Gospel According to John, Books 
1–10, ed. Ronald E. Heine (Washington, DC: Catholic University of  America Press, 
1989), 114.
79Ibid. 
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Origen’s subordinationism clearly went hand in hand with his soteriology. 
Like the rest of  his theology, his soteriology was deeply marked by Greek 
philosophy. As seen above, Origen posited the coeternal existence of  the 
universe inhabited by spiritual beings, or souls, toward whom God exercised 
his perfect power and goodness and who were endowed with free will. At one 
point in the past, some of  these beings turned away from God. The physical 
world was created in order to accommodate and reform these fallen beings, 
who now, joined with earthly bodies, had to be saved, or restored, by God.80 
The salvation of  these lost souls was the primary reason for the incarnation 
of  the Logos, who united himself  with a soul that had not sinned in a previous 
existence.81 Through becoming a man, the Logos became a mediator between 
the philosophical God—“simple, immutable, impassible, and unable to be 
disturbed by time or emotion”82—and humanity.83
While on earth, Christ was both God and man84 and the main purpose 
of  his incarnation was to show humanity the pathway to eternal life,85 i.e., 
reaching the state of  perfection, which clearly is an attribute of  God. Human 
beings, Origen believed, are completely free and are by nature “capable alike 
of  virtue and of  wickedness.”86 Following the example of  the incarnated 
Christ, therefore, they could, if  they chose to, embark on the journey toward 
becoming divine.87 What began with Christ, i.e., “the union of  the divine with 
the human nature,” Origen argued, may also become a reality for humans, who 
“by communion with the divine, might rise to be divine.”88 All they needed to 
do was to “enter upon the life which Jesus taught.”89 The end result of  this 
process was being “changed into God,” 90 otherwise referred to in theological 
80Origen, Princ. 1.8.1, trans. G. W. Butterworth (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 
1973), 67-68. 
81Ibid., 2.6.5 (Butterworth, 112); cf. Donald Fairbrain, “Patristic Soteriology: 
Three Trajectories,” JETS 50 (June 2007): 298. 
82Olson, The Story of  Christian Theology, 111. 
83“This soul, then, acting as a medium between God and the flesh (for it was not 
possible for the nature of  God to mingle with a body apart from some medium), there 
is born, as we said, the God-man, the medium being that existence to whose nature it 
was not contrary to assume a body” (Origen, Princ. 2.6.3; Butterworth, 110).
84Ibid., 2.6.3-4 (Butterworth, 110-112); idem, Cels. 3.41 (ANF 4:480).
85Origen, Cels. 3.28 (ANF 4:475). 
86Origen, Princ. 1.3.8 (Butterworth, 38). Origen followed Clement, and Eastern 
Christianity in general, in subscribing to optimistic anthropology. 
87Origen, Cels. 3.41 (ANF 4:480). 
88Ibid., 3.28 (ANF 4:475).
89Ibid.
90Ibid., 3.41, 3:28 (ANF 4: 480, 475).
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literature as “deification,” or theosis.91 The following passage from Origen’s On 
the First Principles clearly delineates this point: 
Through participation in Christ in his character and wisdom and knowledge 
and sanctification [each believer] advances and comes to higher degrees of  
perfection; and when a man, by being sanctified through participation in the 
Holy Spirit, is made purer and holier, he becomes more worthy to receive 
the grace of  wisdom and knowledge, in order that all stains of  pollution 
and ignorance may be purged and removed and that he may make so great 
an advance in holiness and purity that the life which he received from God 
shall be such as is worthy of  God.92  
Thus, in Origen’s system, salvation was the responsibility of  individual 
believers who, being completely free and having the inborn ability to choose 
between good and evil, were exhorted by Christ and the Holy Spirit to go 
through the stages of  improvement until they were made perfect. Such 
soteriology, notes Donald Fairbrain, “bears an unmistakable resemblance 
to the Middle Platonic philosophy that had seeped into second-century 
Alexandrian Christianity through Philo and Clement.”93
What of  the NT teaching that salvation is to be obtained through the 
blood of  Christ on the cross? Williston Walker wrote that Origen “more than 
any theologian since Paul, emphasized the sacrificial character of  Christ’s 
death.”  Origen, however, did not consider this death as substitutionary, i.e., 
that Christ died on the cross in place of  sinners. While Christ indeed suffered 
and died on the cross, the primary value of  his death lay in the fact that he 
provided an example of  “death endured for the sake of  piety” and “for the 
good of  the human race.”94 Secondarily, his death served as “the first blow 
91See The Oxford Dictionary of  the Christian Church (1997), sv “Deification.” While 
Origen does not appear to use the word theosis, his writings are permeated with the 
concept. Cf. Origen, Comm. Jo. 2.19, 32.338 (trans. Ronald E. Heine, [Washington, 
DC: Catholic University of  America Press, 1993], 99-100, 406); idem, Princ. 1.3.4, 
1.3.8, 2.3.1-2, 4.4.9-10 (Butterworth, 31-32; 38; 83-85; 325-328); idem, Cels. 6.13 (ANF 
4:579).
92Origen, Princ. 1.3.8 (Butterworth, 38). 
93Fairbrain, 298. 
94Origen, Cels. 7.16 (ANF 4:617). Thus Eugene De Fay and Fred Rothwell wrote: 
“[The] work of  the Logos Jesus is adapted to the different categories of  mankind. He 
transmits divine life to ‘gods,’ to ‘thrones,’ to ‘angels,’ as he does to men. To simple 
believers, he is the Saviour qua the crucified one; to the more advanced, he is the 
lightgiver who brings them into direct contact with the Father. In a word, the Christ 
or Logos Jesus is the great intermediary, the dispenser of  all light and life, the evolver 
of  mind and spirit, the mystagogue who introduces men to the transcendent world, 
the initiator into the supreme Gnosis” (Origen and His Work [Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, 
2004], 109); cf. Otto Heick, A History of  Christian Thought (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1965), 
1:121; and Walker, 77. 
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in the conflict which is to overthrow the power of  that evil spirit the devil,” 
who stood in the way of  humanity toward perfect sanctification.95 Origen’s 
hellenizing as well as his emphasis upon human achievement in the process 
of  salvation left little room for the sacrificial/substitutionary understanding 
of  Christ’s death so noticeable in the Pauline writings. Such ideas, he would 
suggest, belong to the sphere of  “simple man,” who has not yet reached a 
state of  enlightenment.96 
While rejecting his soteriology and other elements of  his teachings, many 
Christian theologians who came after Origen acknowledged his theological 
genius and attempted to refine his trinitarian thinking. Some moved toward 
full trinitarianism and affirmed the unity and equality of  Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit. Others, like Arius, brought Origen’s subordinationist views to 
their ultimate conclusions and rendered Christ as a creature. These conflicting 
points of  view clashed during the first ecumenical council of  the church of  
Nicaea in 325 a.D. 
The Importance of  the Findings and Conclusion
The impact of  the Alexandrian school of  theology on ancient Christianity 
was of  such magnitude that no theologian who came after Origen could 
ignore its speculations. To this day, church historians and theologians alike 
consider the theological synthesis of  Origen as one of  the greatest theological 
achievements of  ante-Nicaean antiquity. Yet the Alexandrian school left 
behind a dubious legacy. On one hand, its principal thinkers came closer than 
any other contemporary thinkers to defining the nature of  Christ and the 
Holy Spirit as fully divine and coeternal with that of  the Father himself. On 
the other, their insatiable thirst for the philosophical wisdom of  the age and 
their desire to harmonize it with a NT faith resulted in a creeping syncretism 
that threatened the core of  the Christian faith. As a result of  their lasting 
influence, even the pillars of  Christian orthodoxy, namely, the trinitarian 
creeds of  the Patristic era, are not free from philosophical contaminants. 
Encouraged by their example, Catholic thinkers began to refer to philosophy 
as ancilla theologiae, the “handmaid of  theology,” thus facilitating a departure 
from true biblical Christianity.97 
It appears, however, that Christian theology’s infatuation with philosophy 
had another, even more sinister, outcome, for it affected Christian soteriology 
for generations to come. In this context, crucial questions relating to the 
relationship between subordinationism and deification, or theosis, must 
be asked. Was it coincidental that most pre-Nicaean church fathers were 
subordinationists who believed in theosis as the mode of  salvation? Or was 
95Origen, Cels. 7.16 (ANF 4:617).
96Origen, Princ. 4.2.4-5 (Butterworth, 275-276). 
97Alister E. McGrath, Theology: The Basics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), xxii-xv.
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it an integral part of  their Christology, in which the emphasis was on the 
achievements of  the man-Christ, who, while on earth, attained a divinized 
status by his own efforts? Would that be the primary reason why, in Clement’s 
and Origen’s writings, Christ’s sacrifice on the cross is deemphasized in favor 
of  following the example of  Christ toward perfect sanctification?  
By arguing for the full divinity of  Christ, the Catholicism of  the fourth 
century rejected the soteriological implications of  Alexandrian Christology. 
Instead, under the influence of  Cyprian and likeminded theologians, the 
church became a salvation-bearing organization, in which the emphasis was 
on the teaching that there was little or no possibility of  salvation outside of  
the church.98 The desire for theosis, or perfect sanctification, however, was 
never entirely extinguished, and manifested itself  in the monastic movement 
and various self-mortification activities of  medieval Catholicism. 
Only with the advent of  the Reformation was the idea of  salvation 
via theosis, or salvation via sanctification,99 dealt a serious blow, as the focus 
moved from human achievements to Christ’s achievements on the cross. Both 
Luther and Calvin denied the possibility of  human-divine cooperation with 
regard to salvation.100 Human beings, they charged, were too damaged by sin 
to even respond to God’s initiative. God, they claimed, being the sovereign 
ruler of  the universe, was completely in charge of  human salvation. This is 
understandable. When salvation is placed entirely within the predestinarian 
framework, and thus based entirely on God’s eternal decrees, any human 
action/response is redundant.101 A sanctified life might be the desired result 
of  election, but its presence or lack thereof  does not serve as an indication as 
to whether a person is actually saved. Calvin and Luther, therefore, stand on 
the opposite extreme of  soteriological thinking to that of  the early Christian 
theologians, such as Clement or Origen. 
Luther and Calvin’s position was challenged during the seventeenth century 
by the German Pietists and the Remonstrants (Arminians), respectively.102 
98Olson, The Story of  Christian Theology, 117; Lohse, 97. 
99This is not to say that both Luther and Calvin denied the possibility of  theosis. 
Sanctification was still possible for these reformers, but not as a mode of  salvation. For 
more information, see Michael J. Christensen and Jeffery A. Wittung, eds., Partakers 
of  the Divine Nature: The History and Development of  Deification (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2007), 189-218, and Dennis E. Tamburello, Union with Christ: John Calvin and 
the Mysticism of  St. Bernard (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994). 
100Lohse, 162, 187. 
101It must be noted that while Calvin’s name is more readily associated with 
“predestination,” Luther was no less Augustinian in his predestinarianism than the 
Genevan reformer. Lohse, 187. 
102See Olson, The Story of  Christian Theology, 454-472, 473-492; cf. Roger E. Olson, 
Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Academic, 2006). 
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The thinkers of  both movements argued that the human response to God’s 
initiative did matter and that a saved person’s life would always show signs 
of  sanctification. Human decisions thus played an important role in the 
process of  salvation. Methodism, and later Adventism, was born out of  these 
two movements. These theologies tended to set sanctification in a proper 
relationship to salvation (or justification): that of  the necessary fruit of  
salvation. 
Within modern Adventism, we are currently witnessing a resurgence of  
a version of  Alexandrian thinking with reference to both Christ’s divinity 
and the resultant soteriology. On one hand, few contemporary Adventist 
antitrinitarians agree with Uriah Smith and other early Adventist pioneers, 
who claimed that Christ was created. On the other hand, however, neither are 
they willing to accept the trinitarian teaching of  Christ’s coeternal, fully equal 
divinity. Thus, their only option is Clement and Origen’s concept of  generation 
(or begetting), which, they believe, happened so far in the past before there 
was time, that for all practical purposes Christ could be considered coeternal. 
They, like Clement and Origen, may thus be classified as subordinationists, 
or, as some refer to themselves, “Fountarians.” Does their subordinationism/
fountarianism have any effect on their soteriology? I believe it does. A careful 
study of  antitrinitarian Adventist literature (mostly self-published) reveals an 
interesting trend: the centerpiece of  their soteriology appears to be the life of  
Christ on earth and the example he provided for believers.103 While the death 
103See, e.g., an unpublished paper by Australian author Adrian Ebens, “Return of  
Elijah, submitted for evaluation to the South Pacific Biblical Research Committee in 
2007. In his document of  about 200 pages, Ebens spends considerable effort arguing 
that Jesus is not coequal with the Father in terms of  authority and power and that 
the Father alone is the fount of  all life, including that of  Christ. At the same time, 
Ebens links his argumentation against the trinitarian position with his view that, 
during his incarnation, Christ adopted the postfallen nature of  humanity, positions 
taught by E. J. Waggoner and A. T. Jones, and which he believes was the “essence 
of  the 1888 message.” He thus correctly and incisively argues that “the Doctrine 
of  the Trinity is logically inconsistent with Christ taking our fallen nature” and with 
“traditional” Adventist teachings such as, e.g., character perfection. It is interesting 
to note that, while keeping the commandments and character perfection receive a 
fair amount of  attention, an emphasis on Christ’s accomplishment on the cross on 
behalf  of  humanity is entirely missing in this work. As a result, a reader receives a clear 
impression that, for Ebens, salvation is a result of  a person’s submissive relationship 
with God and Christ (the Holy Spirit is considered as a “power” rather than a being) 
and following the example of  Christ. He thus writes: “Our submission to His request 
to keep the Sabbath, connects us to God in an obedient relationship. In the same 
manner our submission to the Son of  God . . . connects us directly to God in an 
obedient relationship. It is the submission in obedience that opens to us the flow of  
the Father’s blessing” (Unpublished paper, 101-105). While obedience and submission 
do play a role in the process of  salvation, they are always a response to what Christ 
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of  Christ on the cross and its implications are occasionally mentioned, the 
writers (like Origen and Clement) focus mainly on Christ’s accomplishments 
on earth and his subordination to God the Father.104 While the example of  
Jesus must not be ignored in the daily life of  a believer, the above analysis 
shows that a soteriology that focuses almost exclusively on the life of  Jesus 
has its roots directly in the pre-Nicaean teachings of  the early church fathers 
and especially those connected to the Alexandrian school of  theology. In fact, 
I believe that the ultimate roots of  a soteriology of  perfectionism lie in Greek 
philosophy. 
Adventist soteriology values sanctification and the example Christ left for 
his followers. But sanctification has its proper place in relation to justification. 
The latter comes first and was accomplished for believers through Christ’s 
substitutionary sacrifice on the cross. Only then, and through a voluntary 
acceptance of  Christ’s accomplishments on the cross, God, through his Holy 
Spirit, works in the life of  the believer “to will and to act according to his 
good purpose” (Phil 2:13; Heb 13:20-21). A reversal of  this sequence, that is, 
an exaltation of  sanctification to being the mode of  salvation, leads directly to 
a return to the high philosophical ideals of  the ancient Greeks. 
accomplished on the cross. With this emphasis missing, Eben’s teachings are simply a 
return to Clement’s and Origen’s points of  view. For similar positions, see also the self-
published antitrinitarian work by Allen Stump, The Foundation of  Our Faith: Over 150 
Years of  Seventh-day Adventist Christology (Welch WV: Smyrna Gospel Ministries, n.d.).
104Ibid.
